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VOTING RIGHTS OF AMERICANS ABROAD
KENNETH M. DAvDSON*
VERY year millions of United States citizens change their residence. Some
move merely from city to suburbs, others from one section of the country
to another, and still others travel out of the United States. As a consequence of
restrictive state residency requirements many of these Americans are disenfran-
chised each election.1 The structure of the voting laws of the various states was
formulated when moves were less frequent and of longer duration. Today, anti-
quated definitions of residence have the effect of denying the right to vote to
many; and in fact some would be barred under almost any definition of resi-
dence. While commentators have indicated the concern for Americans moving
within the United States,2 less attention has been given to the plight of those
Americans who live abroad. This article examines the voting rights of Americans
who happen to be living outside the United States.
It is inherent in a fully operative democracy that all citizens have the
right to vote. Voting or the right to vote is the "fundamental political right
because [it is] preservative of all rights."3 Under our constitutional system
recourse may be had to the courts and, to a lesser extent, the legislature, to
resist an oppressive executive. However, the protection against an arbitrary
court is in the legislature and protection against a bad or recalcitrant legisla-
ture lies in the power to change the legislators by vote. "[T] he right to vote
freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society,
and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative govern-
ment." 4 To deprive a person of his right to vote is to subject him to the tyranny
of his fellow citizens-no matter how benign or just the rules laid down for
the person may be.
In the United States we have taken great strides towards establishing uni-
versal adult suffrage. Today's concern for the effective vote of the individual,
exemplified in the reapportionment cases 5 and the federal voting rights legisla-
tion0 is a result of an evolution in our constitutional and political thinking. At
the time of the Constitutional Convention, only a minority of the adult popula-
tion was entitled to vote. Suffrage was limited to males and conditioned on
* Assistant Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. B.A. 1963
University of Chicago; LL.B. 1966 University of Pennsylvania; LL.M. 1967 Yale University.
1. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendment of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 848-49 (1961).
2. See, e.g., Schmidhauser, Residency Requirements for Voting and the Tensions of a
Mobile Society, 61 Mac. L. R v. 823 (1963); Note, Voting Rights-Residence Requirementsfor Voting in Presidential Elections, 18 VAxrn. L. Rxv. 337 (1965); Note, 77 HAv. L. Rv.
574 (1964).
3. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
4. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
5. Id.
6. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq. (1965).
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property qualifications. Of course, slaves, indentured servants and women could
not vote.
A main concern of the framers of the Constitution was to democratize the
federal government. 7 The Convention resisted attempts to limit the franchise to
freeholders8 or to have the House of Representatives chosen by the state legis-
latures.9 The principle that the House of Representatives would be elected "by
the people" was settled very early in the Convention.' ° However, the imple-
mentation of this principle was made difficult because the Convention was
unable -to agree upon a set of qualifications for voters." The solution adopted
by the Convention was to leave the qualifications to the states. In order to insure
that the state legislatures did not usurp the electoral power 12 the provision
was written in such a manner that the elections for the House of Representatives
would be as democratic as the election of the most numerous branch of the
state legislature. 13
Although the framers left the qualifications of electors to be determined by
the states, the federal government has intervened on numerous occasions to
promote and preserve the right to vote. The most dramatic example was through
the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the Constitution in
which the United States attempted to give the Negro political equality. While
such efforts were virtually abandoned after the "Compromise of 1877,"14 new
initiatives were taken in the twentieth century. In Nixon v. Herndon,5 the
Supreme Court prohibited racial discrimination in primary elections which
theretofore had been sanctioned by state procedures. When it appeared that such
action was not sufficient, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Allwright' e and Terry
v. Adams17 made explicit that the vote cannot be denied on the basis of race,
nor may subterfuge be used to deny the effectiveness of the vote. Following the
historic decision in 1954 of Brown v. Board of Education,'8 the federal govern-
7. See Hamilton Plan in 3 M. FARRAND, THE REcORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
(hereinafter cited as FARRAND), 619, 620 (1911) and statements of Colonel Mason during
the debates, e.g., 1 FARuRAD 364 and 2 FARRA D 201, 203.
8. See debate in 2 FARRAND 201-206 in which Gouvernor Morris attempted to restrict
voting in federal elections to freeholders. The motion was defeated 7 against-i for-1 state
divided and 1 state absent, 2 FARRNmn 206.
9. The motion lost-8 against-3 for, 1 FARRAND 131.
10. The Convention opened on May 14, 1787. On May 31 the motion that the repre-
sentatives should be elected by the people was carried-6 for-2 against-2 divided, 1
F~aRAND 47. On June 21 the same motion carried-9 for-i against-1 divided. 1 FARAND
353.
11. The difficulty in coming to agreement is demonstrated in the debate in 2 FAiRAND
201-206.
12. See debate, 1 FA.RAND 358-59.
13. U.S. CoxsT. art. I, § 1. "[Tlhe Electors in each State shall have the qualifications
requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature."
14. For a full discussion of the background and terms of Compromise of 1877, see
C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REAcIION, THE COIaROMISE OF 1877 AND THE END OF
REcoNsmuCToN, especially at 7, 8 (1951).
15. 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
16. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
17. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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ment has played a more active role in the elimination of racial discrimination.
Under the authority of the recent voting rights legislation, the federal govern-
ment has become actively engaged in ensuring the voting rights of Negroes.19
As the United States became more industrialized, property qualifications
were gradually abandoned; however, a vestige of that system, the poll tax,
remained. In 1964, the poll tax was eliminated in federal elections by constitu-
tional amendment.20 In 1966 the Supreme Court struck down the poll tax in
state elections on the ground that wealth is an irrelevant consideration in deter-
mining voting rights and therefore was in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the fourteenth amendment.21
The federal government, through the Supreme Court, has also stepped in
where a state has established other unreasonable classifications. In 1965, the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional, a provision which made it impossible for
a member of the armed forces to vote in Texas unless he had been a voter there
before his entry into the armed forces. 22 The provision prevented any member of
the armed forces living in the state from becoming a resident and a voter solely
on the basis of his occupation.
The Supreme Court has also been vigilant in making the vote meaningful-
to have it counted, 23 and not to have it diluted by ballot-box stuffing.24 In
Reynolds v. Sims2 5 the Supreme Court held that each person's vote should
have equal effect: specifically, that geographical representation should not
dilute any voter's influence on the electoral process by allowing some districts
to represent many fewer persons than others.
Lack of discrimination in and the protection of the electoral process are
the constitutional concern of the federal government. It is the duty and preroga-
tive of the states to decide when a person is qualified-for example, whether
the vote should be given at age 18 or 21, or what criteria should be used to
determine idiocy or insanity. However, if the states should set the voting age
at 65 or otherwise discriminate unreasonably against a group, the federal gov-
ernment, through the Congress, the Supreme Court and the executive, has both
the right and duty to intervene.26
Despite efforts to ensure the vote to other groups, American civilians living
abroad are either denied the vote or given it on all but impossible terms due to a
19. See note 6 supra.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
21. Harper v. Virginia State Ed. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
22. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
23. United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915).
24. United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944).
25. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
26. "The privilege to vote in any state is not given by the Federal Constitution, or
by any of its amendments .... [Ilt does not follow from mere citizenship of the United
States. In other words, the privilege to vote in a State is within the jurisdiction of the
State itself, to be exercised as the State may direct, and upon such terms as it may deem
proper, provided, of course, no discrimination is made between individuals in violation of
the Federal Constitution." Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904).
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variety of procedural difficulties. They remain subject to the jurisdiction of the
federal government.27 While subject to federal taxation, military obligations, and
other forms of control, they are without representation in the government of the
United States. It is the purpose of this article to demonstrate that these Ameri-
cans have a constitutional right to vote in federal elections. The first part of the
paper is devoted to a discussion of the possibilities of qualifying to vote under
the most liberal of the present voting laws.28 The second part of the paper is
devoted to showing that residence requirements, established by the states, which
prevent American civilians living abroad from voting in federal elections are
unconstitutional.
An American who has lived abroad for a substantial period of time attempt-
ing to register to vote in an election will normally be rejected by local election
officials on the ground that he is no longer qualified because he has ceased to be
a resident of the state. State statutes typically require a person to be a resident
of the state for the year immediately preceding the election in which he seeks to
vote. A resident need not necessarily be physically present within the state; he
may be absent for varying periods of time. It is the intention of this section to
show that the overwhelming majority of existing statutes can easily be inter-
preted in a manner which would allow Americans living abroad to vote. The
following discussion is founded on a hypothetical set of facts set in Kentucky,
whose domicile concept is used in an overwhelming majority of the other states.29
Consider a typical American living in Europe with his family. He is em-
ployed by a private company and his contract is for two years. He considers
his home to be Kentucky, but owns no real or personal property there. He
expects to return to Kentucky, but thinks he might stay in Europe longer than
two years if his contract is extended. When and where he will move next will
most likely be decided by the company for which he works. Can such an Amer-
ican vote by absentee ballot in Kentucky during his two years abroad? The
question cannot be answered definitely because the courts have neither dealt
with cases concerning Americans living abroad nor with cases in which the
claimant was attempting to vote by absentee ballot.
The American living abroad qualifies as a voter in Kentucky under all the
constitutional and statutory provisions except, perhaps, as to the residency
requirement. Residence does not mean actual abode. Indeed, the Kentucky
statute says, in part, "A voter shall not lose his residence by absence for tem-
porary purposes merely. . . ,,1o The statute has been construed to be a legis-
27. See notes 78-80 infra and accompanying text.
28. This paper does not deal in detail with the difficulties of registration faced by
Americans living abroad. See, however, discussion infra at 13-14.
29. See note 42 infra and accompanying text.
30. Ky. Rxv. STATUTES § 117.610(2) (1965).
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lative enactment of the common law rules of domicile. 31 Temporary purposes
have been construed to mean absence to perform a "particular service" or a
"particular job."'32 A two year absence would qualify as temporary. 3 The only
statutory provision dealing with the loss of residence says "a voter shall lose
his residence by removal to another state or county ... with intention to reside
there for an indefinite time." 34 The provision does not say there shall be a loss
of residence for removal to a foreign country.35 The residence provisions do not
preclude the retention of residence, i.e., domicile, where an American moves to a
foreign country. Such a result has some support from Kentucky cases. In
Everman v. Thomas36 the Kentucky Court of Appeals said "[W]here a domicile
has been established it continues until the person renounces it and takes up an-
other instead.13 7 One of the cases dealt with by the Court concerned a minister
whose work was itinerant. Although he moved once a year and sometimes more
frequently, he stated he intended to return at some point in the future, and in
fact visited the district often. He claimed and was allowed to vote from a resi-
dence consisting of a farm in which his wife had a future interest as remainder-
man after her mother's life estate. From this it appears that the court allows
those to vote who say they intend to return in the future (without any qualifica-
tion as to when in the future) and/or those who have not been able to acquire
a new residence because of the nature of their jobs.
The language in Everman v. Thomas to the effect that voters do not lose their
voting residence until they "take up another"38 has support in other jurisdic-
tions. The Alabama Supreme Court has taken substantially the same position:
A domicile once acquired is presumed to continue until a change, facto
et animo, is shown. If there was a change, there must have been both
an abandonment of his former domicile with no present intention to
return, and the establishment of another place of residence with inten-
tion to remain permanently, or, at least, for an unlimited time; the
former may be inferred from the latter ... 39 Nothing short of an un-
equivocal and affirmative establishment of a new domicile is effective
to change that original and established domicilary status.04
An American abroad could qualify under this test which requires only that he
does not have an intent to remain away for an unlimited time.
31. Everman v. Thomas, 303 Ky. 156, 169-70, 197 S.W.2d 58, 66 (1946).
32. Matney v. Elswick, 242 Ky. 183, 184, 45 S.W.2d 1046, 1047 (1932).
33. Everman v. Thomas, 303 Ky. 156, 168, 197 S.W.2d 58, 65 (1946) (ten year absence
allowed).
34. Ky. RFv. STATUTES § 117.610(3) (1965).
35. Few statutes have any reference to removal to other countries.
36. Everman v. Thomas, 303 Ky. 156, 169-70, 197 S.W.2d 58, 66 (1946).
37. Id. at 168, 197 S.W.2d at 65.
38. Id. at 169, 197 S.W.2d at 66.
39. Pope v. Howle, 227 Ala. 154, 156, 149 So. 222, 223 (1933) quoting Holmes v.
Holmes, 212 Ala. 597, 599, 103 So. 884, 886 (1925). It is not clear what the facts of the
case are as the court decides the case on the ground that the claimants could not be dis-
qualified without being questioned about their intent to remain in their new house. Accord,
Mitchell v. Kinney, 242 Ala. 196, 5 So.2d 788 (1942) quoting the same passage.
40. Pope v. Howle, 227 Ala. 154 at 155, 149 So. 222, 223 (1933).
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The Oklahoma court has taken a similar position in a case concerning a per-
son who returned on weekends, stored furniture locally, and returned to vote.
Although the claimant was not sure when he would return as a permanent resi-
dent, it was clear that he desired to do so and that he only left the state to work.
To effect a change of residence, there must be an actual abandonment
of the first domicile, coupled with an intent not to return to it, and
there must be a new domicile, acquired by actual residence in another
place of jurisdiction, with the intention of making this last acquired
residence a permanent home.41
It seems clear that this test would also allow an American abroad to qualify as
a voter.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina took this position in almost identical
language.42 However, in an early case the North Carolina court hypothetically
considered the situation of a person doing business while residing in Europe
and expressed some doubt as to whether residence would have been retained.
43
The statutes of all but four states treat residence as synonomous with domi-
cile.44 At least two conclusions are justified. First, there is considerable language
in the definitions of residence or domicile that a domicile for voting purposes is
not lost until a new domicile is gained. Second, a domicile is gained only by
actual removal and intent to make the new residence a permanent home. Thus,
in any of forty-five states45 an American civilian living abroad can make a sub-
stantial claim that he is entitled to vote under the existing residence laws.
While it is true that the courts are reticent to disenfranchise persons who are
neither incompetent nor being punished, nevertheless, much of the domicile
language might be held inapplicable to Americans living abroad. All of the cases
in which the courts have upheld the right to vote have certain parallel circum-
stances. The claimants owned real or personal property in the district, visited it
with some regularity, and sought to vote in person, not by absentee ballot. Al-
most none of the claimants could assert the right to vote in any district other
than that in which the claim was lodged. The American abroad can only base
his claim to vote on one of these factors: he cannot vote where he is living in
41. James v. Burkett, 346 P.2d 338 at 34-1 (1959). See also Richardson v. Gregg, 206
Or. 446, 290 P. 190 (1930) holding the same, citing 29 C.J. 69 which requires (1) the
existence of a residence somewhere and (2) the continuation of residence until a new one is
acquired.
42. "To effect a change of domicile, there must be an actual abandonment of the
first domicile, coupled with an intention not to return to it, and there must be a new
domicile acquired by actual residence at another place or within another jurisdiction,
coupled with an intention of making the last acquired residence a permanent home." Owens
v. Chaplin, 228 N.C. 705, 708, 47 S.E. 2d 12, 15 (1948) (emphasis added).
43. Hannan v. Grizzard, 89 N.C. 115 (1883). Claimant was considered a resident for
voting purposes after a seven year absence. Claimant owned property in the district and
visited the district occasionally. Nonetheless, the language was quoted in Owens v. Chaplin,
228 N.C. 705, 47 S.E.2d 12 (1948).
44. The exceptions are: Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland and New Jersey. Ohio defines
residence as domicile but limits temporary absence to three years.
45. Note, however, that South Carolina and New Mexico do not have absentee ballot
provisions for civilians.
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Europe. These cases appear to be responsive to at least two policy considera-
tions: that a citizen be allowed to vote; and, that he vote only in a place where
he has objectively manifested connections. These policies may conflict in situa-
tions where the claimant is living in Europe and must be able to vote from his
former United States residence if at all. Although one might expect that courts
would interpret residency statutes to maximize voting rights, alternative pol-
icies may persuade them to do otherwise. Some courts may give greater weight
to the claimant's current connections with the voting district and his intent to
return, since many of the candidates and issues voted upon are of local concern
only.
The absence of cases determining the right of Americans abroad to vote
should not be interpreted as a lack of interest in voting on the part of Americans
living abroad. On the contrary, in the 1964 and 1968 Presidential elections
vigorous campaigns were waged in Europe including mass rallies and consider-
able publicity all of which was supported by contributions of Americans living
abroad. The failure to bring cases is more the result of a failure to understand
the basis of their rights and an inability to comply with a variety of procedural
requisites involved in registering and voting. In addition, many may be dis-
couraged from bringing suits on a novel issue, not only because of the expense,
but also because by the time their rights were litigated the elections would long
be over. Americans abroad have only recently joined together and taken a long
term view of the issue. After the 1964 election the Democratic and Republican
parties formed the Bipartisan Committee on Absentee Voting. Thus far, their
efforts have been primarily concentrated on collecting data, advising Americans
residing in Europe of their voting rights and attempting to convince Congress
to enact legislation in the area.
It is likely that in many cases retention of residence and consequent ability
to vote will turn upon whether the claimant intends to return to his state of
last residence. The difficulty of establishing this intent will vary with the facts
of the case and the state in which the claimant wishes to vote. An affidavit to
that effect would probably not be sufficient to establish the claimant's intent to
return; however, it might be sufficient to raise a question of fact should a claim-
ant bring a suit to be given a ballot. In the decided cases, however, courts seem
to have been most persuaded by objective manifestations of intent to return,
such as property owned within the jurisdiction and regularity of visits. Voting
rights are too important to be left in such a confused and complicated position.
Court processes are too slow to assure the right to vote. It is the responsibility
of state legislatures to clarify the voting rights of Americans abroad so that
they can be quickly determined by election officials.
Even if the American living abroad can satisfy the residence requirements,
he is likely to be barred from voting because of state registration laws. Stuart
H. Johnson, Jr., testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and
Elections on behalf of the League of American Citizens Residing Abroad, de-
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clared that twenty-one states require personal registration as a prerequisite to
voting.46 If an American finds that he can register and satisfy the residency
requirements, he may still be unable to vote. For example, South Carolina and
New Mexico have no provision for absentee ballots for civilians, and Arkansas
requires that its absentee ballots be exercised within the state.47 More subtle
impediments exist in applying for and executing absentee ballots in other states.
Arizona requires the voter to swear an oath as to his identity before an officer
authorized by law on both his application for an absentee ballot and the ballot
itself.48 In many cases the only place where a person living abroad can find
an "authorized" officer will be at the American Embassy, which may be far
from his residence. The state legislatures should not only remove the doubt
surrounding the voting qualifications of Americans abroad, but should also es-
tablish simple and explicit rules governing absentee registration and voting.
Congress has recommended to the states, in an amendment to the Federal Voting
Assistance Act of 1955,49 a simplified registration and ballot application pro-
cedure5 O and an increase in the number of persons authorized to administer
oaths.5 1 Congress can and should do more to protect the suffrage of those en-
titled to vote under state law. It should exercise its powers under article I of
the Constitution, 52 to set up procedures insuring that anyone entitled to vote
will not be prevented from doing so by state procedural rules.
The present uncertainty surrounding the right to vote under existing resi-
dence requirements and the fact that some citizens will have no intention to
return to the state of their last residence insures that substantial numbers of
Americans will not be able to vote. This raises the question of whether these
citizens are being treated fairly, both in terms of good public policy and con-
stitutional equal protection.
II
[T]he right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and demo-
cratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a
free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and po-
46. Hearings on S1881 and S2884 Before the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections
of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 14 (1968).
The states Mr. Johnson listed were: Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina and Virginia. Id., note 1. Mr. Johnson seems to have overlooked at least Nevada
and Washington whose statutes (Nev. Rev. Statutes § 292.180 (1965) and Rev. Code of
Wash. Ann. § 29.07.070 (1962)) require a personal appearance as a prerequisite to registration.
47. See ARx. Rr'v. STAT. § 3-1101 and § 3-1102 (1954). Members of the armed forces
are able to vote under a separate procedure.
48. Auz. Rav. STAT. § 16-1103 and § 16-1105 (1956).
49. 5 U.S.C. 2171 et seq. (1964).
go. Pub. L. No. 90-343 (1968).
51. Pub. L. No. 90-344 (1968).
52. "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representa-
tives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at
any time make or alter such Regulation . . . " U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 4, ci. 1.
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litical rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote
must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.5 3
An examination of existing state election laws yields the following results.
The voting laws established by the states permit persons living abroad, who are
employed in civil and military capacities by the federal government, advantages
in qualifying to vote which are not accorded to others living abroad. This dif-
ference in treatment creates an arbitrary classification in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. Furthermore, residence requirements-whether based on
actual residence or domicile-are unconstitutional when applied to federal elec-
tions, also on the grounds of a denial of equal protection, because they create
unreasonable classifications. The proper grounds for voting in federal elections
are competency, that is, mental capacity and maturity, and state citizenship.
The American living abroad who satisfies these criteria cannot constitutionally
be denied the right to vote.
GENERAL STATE VOTING REQUIREMENTS
Under the present statutory structure the states usually accord the right
to vote to persons who (1) are citizens of the United States, (2) have resided
within the state's borders for the year immediately preceding the election, and
(3) have attained the age of twenty-one. These three qualifications, although
not universal, provide the general framework of the election laws. In addition
to such qualifications, the states also establish criteria for excluding lunatics,
morons and felons from voting. The reason for barring minors, lunatics and
morons is obvious, even if the exact definition of the classes is not. The system
of democratic government is based on expression of the general will through
individual self-expression. Lunatics, minors and morons are incapable of rea-
soned expression. Felons are barred, not on the basis of incapacity, but as a
punishment for acts against society as well as to protect the electoral process.54
Aliens cannot vote because they are not members of the political entity. The
general structure of voting laws is capacity, membership in the political entity
and presence within the geographic borders of the political entity, although
there are exceptions to this last requirement.
SPECIAL ABSENTEE STATUS
All states allow members of the armed forces who were qualified to vote at
the time of their induction to continue voting as if they had remained at their
last address. 55 State statutes or constitutions typically declare that no member
of the armed forces shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence in his
53. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) (emphasis added).
54. Some doubt has recently been cast on the validity of disenfranchising felons. See
Otsuka v. Rite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 414 P.2d 412, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966); but see Green v.
Ed. of Elections of City of New York, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967) cert. den. - U.S. -
(1968).
55. See, e.g., CAL. CoNsT. art. 4, § 4.
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state merely by reason of presence or absence within the state. Forty-one states
have adopted wholly or in part the congressional recommendations contained
in the Voting Assistance Act.56 The Act recommends that the states extend the
vote and important procedural niceties to: members of the armed forces;
civilians working for the federal government, but not living within any state or
the District of Columbia; members of the Merchant Marine of the United
States; members of religious and welfare organizations assisting the armed
forces; and spouses and dependents of the above-mentioned groupsr 7 A num-
ber of states have extended the benefit of the legislation to persons engaged in
the navigation of the internal waterways of the United States"8 and one state
went so far as to include crewmen on all interstate common carriers.5 9
The effect of this legislation, whether the treatment of residence is con-
sidered as a rebuttable or irrebuttable presumption, is to allow the soldier
(hereinafter "soldier" is used to designate any person in the groups who are
given the special status) to vote upon a showing that (1) he is a citizen of the
United States, (2) he lived in the state for a period of at least one year im-
mediately preceding his induction into the army, and (3) he is now twenty-one
years of age. In contrast to the civilian living abroad (hereinafter "civilian" is
used to mean any person not given special status), the soldier need not estab-
lish anything concerning current residence, much less an intention to return.
These facts, without more, raise a question of a violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.
T= SPECIAL ABSENTEE STATUS VIOLATES TiE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
In order to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause it is neces-
sary to establish the existence of a class, and to show that the class has been
divided into an unreasonable classification by statute, that is, that the statute
discriminates unconstitutionally. The total class in this case includes all state
citizens. The Constitution makes the states the fundamental electoral unit.
Senators, Congressmen and the President, through the electoral college, are
elected through the states.
The initial question is whether the soldier or the civilian is a member of
the class, that is, whether either retains his citizenship after his physical de-
parture from the state. If neither does, then the question of whether the civilian
is being treated unfairly vis-h-vis the soldier is moot as neither would have any
connection with the state on which to be accorded the right to vote. The reap-
56. The states which have not are Alabama, Arkansas, Hawaii, Indiana, Michigan,
New York, Ohio, Virginia and West Virginia. The classification here is somewhat misleading,
because, as mentioned earlier, all states allow members of the armed forces to vote. The
figure forty-one represents the number of states that have patterned their statutes on the
Congressional recommendation; see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
57. Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955, 5 U.S.C. 2171 et seq. (1955).
58. See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
59. Miss. STAT. ANN. 14 § 2196-91 (1948).
478
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portionment cases,60 together with the ballot counting cases,61 make it clear
that the right to vote may not be diluted. To give the vote to those not mem-
bers of the political entity would dilute the vote of those enitled to it as much
as would the malapportioned districts or stuffing the ballot boxes. To put the
question directly, is the Constitution so structured as to make it impossible for
large groups of Americans to enter into the political life of the country? The
fourteenth amendment provides that a citizen of the United States shall also be
a citizen of the state in which he resides.62 The amendment was specificially
intended to assure that Negroes and others should be considered citizens of their
states of residence. The phraseology of the fourteenth amendment is declaratory
of the method of gaining state citizenship; it does not declare how one loses
state citizenship.
The United States under the federal system endows double or layered
citizenship-of the nation and of the state. Both are rights granted by the
fourteenth amendment and neither may be dissolved without sufficient reason.
The question is whether physical removal from the state provides sufficient
reason for dissolution of those rights.63 The right to travel within and without
the United States is constitutionally guaranteed6 4 and the exercise of that right
may not be used as an occasion for punishment with a possible exception not
here relevant.05 In Trop v. Dulles"6 the plurality opinion of the Supreme Court
held that expatriation for desertion in time of war was a cruel and unusual
punishment. Justice Brennan concurred on the ground that there did not exist
a rational relationship between the punishment and the crime. In Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez67 the United States attempted to deprive certain persons of
their citizenship, who, contrary to law, remained outside of the United States
for the purpose of avoiding military service. The Supreme Court held the de-
privation of citizenship to be punishment; accordingly, the expatriation was not
valid since, in conducting the proceedings in the absence of Mendoza-Martinez,
60. See supra note 4.
61. See supra notes 23 and 24 and accompanying text.
62. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S.
CoxsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
63. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 138 (1872) discusses whether state citizenship might
continue after removal. However, the Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73-74
(1873) and Pemberton v. Colonna, 290 F.2d 220 (3d Cir. 1961) postulate that state citi-
zenship would disappear upon loss of domicile. But in neither case was the discussion
determinative of the outcome of the case.
64. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378
U.S. 500 (1964).
65. For instance quarantine regulations are valid to contain persons within or without
an area to prevent spread of disease. Also in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) the Supreme
Court indicated that it may be constitutional for the federal government to prohibit
American citizens from traveling to certain countries where their travels will interfere with
the conduct of foreign relations. The issue has not been finally determined because the Court
in United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967) held the statute did not authorize criminal
sanctions.
66. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
67. 372 U.S. 1444 (1963).
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there was a lack of due process of law. Presumably if the Court had faced
the issue on the merits in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, it would have de-
clared the law unconstitutional on the same basis as it did in Tropp v. Dulles.8
The issue was finally disposed of in Afroyin v. RuskOO wherein the Supreme
Court held not only that deprivation of citizenship may not be employed by
Congress as a punishment, but "[o]nce acquired, this Fourteenth Amendment
citizenship [is] not to be shifted, cancelled, or diluted at the will of the Federal
Government, the States, or any other governmental unit. ' 70 The Court con-
cluded by stating that dissolution of citizenship must be the result of a volun-
tary renunciation by the individualil The citizenship granted by the fourteenth
amendment is state as well as national. Together, as the Constitution makes
explicit, they form citizenship in our country. A state or other governmental
unit has no more power to deprive a citizen of his state citizenship than they
have to deprive him of his national citizenship.
It may be contended that although the states may not deprive a person of
his state citizenship, the Constitution makes residence relevant to the loss of state
citizenship. This is true for moves within the United States. The definition of
state citizenship in the fourteenth amendment is formulated to make explicit its
primary purpose-the granting of citizenship. Clearly, the language referring to
residence covers the general case of a Negro living in any state. It also covers
any United States citizen who moves from one state to another. In order to per-
mitmobility of persons between the various states, out-of-staters must enjoy
or become able to enjoy the same rights as in-staters. The Privileges and Im-
munities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the definition of state cit-
izenship all contribute to this goal. State citizenship based upon mere residence
automatically puts the new in-stater on an equal political footing with the other
in-staters as does the Equal Protection Clause. This new citizenship, however,
is inconsistent with citizenship in the former state of residence and thus the old
state citizenship must be terminated. By virtue of the fourteenth amendment,
residing in a new state must be the equivalent of swearing allegiance to it and
renouncing the former state citizenship thereby effecting a termination of the
68. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). At least three members of the Court, Justices Black, Douglas
and Brennan, would have reached the merits in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez and there
is no indication in the opinion that the members that justice Goldberg was writing for
would not follow the Trop case if they had reached the issue.
69. 387 U.S. 253 (1967). See also Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 737, 827 (1924).
70. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 262 (1967).
71. "Citizenship in this Nation is part of a cooperative affair. Its citizenry is the coun-
try and the country its citizenry. The very nature of our free government makes it com-
pletely incongruous to have a rule of law under which a group of citizens temporarily in
office can deprive another group of citizens of their citizenship. We hold that the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to, and does, protect every citizen of this nation against a con-
gressional forcible destruction of his citizenship, whatever his creed, color, or race. Our hold-
ing does no more than to give to this citizen that which is his own, a constitutional right to
remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship." Id. at
268.
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old state citizenship. If this were not the case, the totally incongruous situation
would occur wherein one person would be a member of two separate parts of the
same entity. In this sense residence is relevant to the loss of state citizenship.
On the other hand, where Americans move from their state to a foreign
country or an American such as a soldier or a convict is involuntarily moved,
residence is not relevant to the loss of state citizenship.72 Thus, despite the fact
that a soldier might be able to gain new citizenship in another state he does not
begin to qualify as a person who has voluntarily relinquished his citizenship.
In the case of an American moving to a foreign country, he makes no renuncia-
tion of his citizenship, and there is no reason to deprive him of it. The incon-
gruity of dual state citizenship is not present. However, an equally great
abnormality would be present were the person to find himself without part of
the layered citizenship granted by the Constitution.
Having established the existence of the class and that both the soldier and
the civilian living abroad are members of it, the question is whether by accord-
ing different treatment to these groups the states have created an unreasonable
classification in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Differing treatment is
justifiable only on the basis of different circumstances. There are two differences
between the soldier and the civilian living abroad-the national service factor
in his work and the involuntary nature of his transfer. Being a soldier is a
valid basis for some benefits, e.g., G.I. Bill of Rights, cheaper transportation,
etc. However, voting cannot be considered in the same category. In Gray v.
Sanders, the Supreme Court said that occupation was not a permissible basis
for determining who shall vote.73 In Carrington v. Rash7 4 the Court held spe-
cifically that under the Equal Protection Clause, being a soldier did not estab-
lish a permissible class to distinguish between prospective voters. The Texas
statute in question purported to prevent any person who was a member of the
armed forces from becoming a Texas resident for voting purposes while he
remained in the armed forces. Although the effect of the Court's ruling was to
gain the vote for Sergeant Carrington, the decision also precludes a state from
using soldier status as a basis for granting the vote. The Equal Protection
Clause addresses itself to the rationality of classifications and cannot, at the
same time, adjudge "soldierness" to be both a rational and irrational classifica-
tion for the purpose of qualifying as a resident under voting statutes. This is
not to say that there may not be some aspects of being a soldier which are
unique and may be used to justify different treatment, as for instance, involun-
tary change of residence which is considered below. The point is that being a
soldier is a neutral factor, which cannot serve as a basis for awarding or denying
72. See further discussion of this point infra text accompanying note 82. Also note
many states specifically provide that convicts will not gain residence. See e.g., CAL. CoNsT.
art. II, § 4.
73. 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963).
74. See note 22 supra, and accompanying text.
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voting or residential privileges. If the right to vote were given as a reward for
national service, such honorary voting would dilute the power of the vote of
those who are otherwise entitled to exercise that right. Moreover, as has already
been noted, the Supreme Court has in numerous cases denied the right of state
legislatures to dilute the power of the vote held by those entitled to it. Different
voting treatment is unjustified whether it be by unequal geographical represen-
tation, adding extra ballots, 75 or because of the nature of national service.
There remains to be considered whether different voting treatment can be
justified on the basis of the involuntary nature of a transfer of a voter from the
state. In itself, involuntariness would not allow for different treatment, but, in
part, the states use this feature to create a basis for the retention of a fictional
residence (domicile) discussed in earlier sections of this article.70 The special
absentee status statutes might be justified on the grounds that if a person has
been involuntarily transferred from the state, then it is a fair presumption that
he intends tQ return when he becomes free of that restraint. Therefore it is both
fair and reasonable that the person who leaves involuntarily need not prove his
intent to return, but that the person who leaves voluntarily must do so. 77 It is
clear that such reasoning is not valid when applied to persons who are not mem-
bers of the armed forces. An employee of the federal government who is trans-
ferred to a post abroad is under no more compulsion than an employee of a
world wide corporation who is transferred abroad. To a lesser extent the same
thing is often true of members of the armed forces. Other than those who have
been drafted or join to serve their minimum military obligation, the move away
from the state has been the result of a voluntary act on their part differing
only slightly from the person who signs a contract which requires him to work
abroad. Except in the case of draftees or their equivalent, there is no basis on
which to differentiate treatment of the special groups from that of the civilian
living abroad. There being no basis for the differentiation, the difference in
treatment presently accorded the civilian living abroad violates the Equal
Protection Clause as setting up an unreasonable classification.
The likely effect of a court determination that the special absentee status
statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause would be to deny the benefits of
such statutes to all but the draftees and their equivalent. In this event all others
would have to qualify equally under the state residence requirements-either
legal residence, along the lines of domicile, or actual residence, unless such re-
quirements are themselves unconstitutional.
75. See notes 60 and 61 supra and accompanying text; see also United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299 (1941); Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S.
371 (1879).
76. See supra text accompanying notes.
77. Such reasoning would appear to be consistent with the statement of the Supreme
Court in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), which requires an element of volation in
the dissolution of citizenship.
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RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERAL ELECTIONS
VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Since the civilian living abroad and the special groups both will generally
retain their state citizenship while residing outside the state, the question arises
whether either domiciliary residence or actual residence is a constitutional basis
for denying the vote to citizens living abroad.78
Domicile. If domicile has any relevance to voting qualifications, it is on
the basis that the domiciliary intends to return in the future and thus will be
subject to the abuses or benefits of the matters voted upon. In a democracy it
is necessary that voters be subject to the consequences of their votes. Voters
might be less serious in casting their ballots were they not to be affected by the
outcome.
While the requirement of domicile or actual residence may be a reason-
able condition for voting on state matters, it is irrelevant when electing federal
legislators or Presidents. An American living abroad is under controls and re-
straints of the federal government. He is subject to federal taxation, 79 liable
to the draft,80 subject to subpoena, 8' and regulated in part by that country's
agreements with the United States. To be sure, the exercise of federal power
falls differently upon the American living abroad than it does upon the Ameri-
can living within the United States; however, federal laws, such as farm legisla-
tion, depletion allowances, and others, affect differently those living within the
United States as well. The point is that the American living abroad is subject
to the power of the United States government so long as he remains a citizen.
The power exercised by the United States over an American living abroad is
far greater than that exercised by a state over the domiciliary living outside of
the state.82 Thus states might reasonably differentiate between domiciliary and
78. The Supreme Court has faced only one case concerning the constitutionality of
residence requirements. In that case the Court affirmed without opinion the decision of a
three judge district court upholding a Maryland statute that required one year of residence
as a prerequisite of voting in any election. Drueding v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721 (1964)
aff'd per curium 380 U. S. 125 (1965). However that case was presented in a different con-
text from that presented here. Drueding based his claim to vote in Maryland solely on federal
citizenship and current residence in Maryland. He did not attempt to establish any connec-
tion with Maryland on the basis of state citizenship. It may be, as the district court sug-
gested, that the states have much discretion if the issue is residence alone, but such discretion
disappears where citizenship is concerned. See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text.
In any case the Supreme Court has agreed to hear a challenge to the Colorado requirement
of six months residence for voters. Hall v. Beals, appeal docketed, U.S. Supreme Court, No.
39, Jan. 16, 1969.
79. 26 U.S.C. § 911 (1965).
80. 50 U.S.C. § 462 (1965).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1965).
82. In general, domiciliaries living outside a state will not be subject to the laws of a
state until they resume living in the state. See, e.g., New York Tax Law §§ 350-357 (Mc-
Kinney 1966). "The word 'resident' applies only to natural persons and includes any person
domiciled in the state, except a person who, though domiciled in the state, maintains no
permanent place of abode within the state, but does maintain a permanent place of abode
without the state, and who spends in the aggregate not to exceed thirty days of the taxable
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non-domiciliary citizens as to voting rights in state elections; however, a similar
differentiation with respect to federal elections would be constitutionally unrea-
sonable.
Actual residence. A state requirement of actual residence 3 would present
a stronger case for differential treatment. Such a framework would accord the
vote to those who had a home in the state, which was their usual abode, and
bar all absentee voting by those living outside the state, including members of
the armed forces. A requirement of actual residence could be justified on the
basis of several different policies: (1) the voter would be under the jurisdiction
of the elected officials; (2) the voter would suffer the benefits or abuses of mat-
ters voted upon; (3) the voter would have familiarity with the local situation
and its aspirations; (4) the voter would interact with candidates and other
voters.
In order to determine whether a requirement of actual residence is a con-
stitutionally permissible classification, it is necessary to examine whether the
American living aboard is affected by these policies and if he is not, whether
the policies can constitutionally be made conditions of voting.
As pointed out in the discussion of the constitutionality of the domicile
theory, an American living abroad is under the jurisdiction of the United
States;8 4 thus for federal purposes the policy of having him under the jurisdic-
tion of those elected is satisfied. In like manner, the American living abroad is
affected by the acts of Congress and suffers the benefits or abuses of those mat-
ters on which he votes.8 5
While it is clear that an American living abroad has less opportunity for
familiarity with the local state situation than a person residing within the state,
he can inform himself through newspapers and other media if he wishes. It is
also clear that an American living abroad has greater opportunity to be familiar
with the international problems that will be faced by his federal representative
than a person living within the district. Whereas the person within the state
knows more about local conditions, the person abroad knows more about inter-
national conditions. There is no test given to voters to determine if they pay
attention to the local conditions or sympathize with local aspirations. Indeed
any such test would be constitutionally suspect in itself; thus failure to qualify
on this point cannot be used to bar a person from voting.
It is perhaps the aspect of interaction which suggests most strongly the
case for representation of a cohesive group defined by geographical borders. Yet
even Congressional, Senatorial, and Presidential "districts" can hardly be char-
year within the state." But cf. Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 262 N.Y.S. 2d 463, 209
N.E.2d 792 (1965).
83. No state has an unequivocal requirement of actual residence. This article deals with
the possibility of such a requirement in order to determine whether an American living
abroad can be denied the vote by altering the present voting structure.
84. See notes 78-80 supra and accompanying text.
85. Id.
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acterized as groups of high interaction. Senatorial and Presidential districts
encompass the whole state. A Congressman represents over 400,000 persons.8
Wide varieties of persons from the richest to the poorest, rural and urban may
be brought together in a single Congressional district. Their concern for or
awareness of each other's existence is problematical. Their identity is created
only by the fact that they all have the same Congressman. Even this identity
is altered periodically when the state is redistricted to take into account changes
in population. How can it be said that an American living abroad is not a
member of this entity, the voting district, which itself has no attribute other
than the fact that it comprehends all the persons who vote for a Congressman?
Within the Congressional district the relevant interchange takes place, if at all,
between the candidate and the voter, the Congressman and constituent. Amer-
icans abroad can be approached by mail for their views and support. They
can and should be able to write to their Congressman. Moreover in a practical
vein, all contacts which do in fact occur involve largely voluntary actions on the
part of the voter. The voter is not compelled to talk with his neighbors nor
listen to the candidate. It is up to the voter to decide by what criteria he will
cast his ballot. It is of course desirable that he inform himself on the issues
and participate in their formulation. An American abroad can do both in vary-
ing degrees and is thus in relative parity with resident Americans. Since require-
ments mandating optimum degrees of interaction could not constitutionally be
imposed, tests formulated on the basis of such interaction could not constitu-
tionally bar the American abroad from voting.
As can be seen from the above discussion the American living abroad satis-
fies all of the requirements relating to residence or domicile that can be made
mandatory with respect to federal elections. Consequently, to deny him the
vote on the basis of the absence of an actual residence in the state would
create an arbitrary and unreasonable classification in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.
One final objection to extending the vote in federal elections to Americans
living abroad might be made on the basis of the words of the Constitution which
provides that the electors of Senators and Congressmen "shall have the quali-
fications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legis-
lature. ' 'sT At first glance it would seem that if a person were not able to vote
for state legislators, then he would be automatically barred from voting in
federal elections.88 However, it is clear from the records of the Constitutional
Convention that the quoted words were intended as a restriction on the power
86. See U.S. DFPr. or Co EcE, BupyAu or CEisus, CONRESSiONAL DisTR.cT DATA
Boox (1963).
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 and amend XVII.
88. Note that such a situation did exist after the passage of the twenty-fourth amend-
ment (which outlawed the poll tax in federal elections) until Harper v. Virginia State Board
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Presumably the situation would continue to exist had
not the poll tax been held to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
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of state legislatures to usurp the electoral power in federal elections, rather
than as a prerequisite for voting.8 9 Mr. Wilson, speaking for the Committee
on Detail at the Constitutional Convention, explained the reasons for the
formulation which qualified the previously unqualified election "by the
people." 90 First, it was too difficult to agree upon a single set of qualifications
for electors,91 and any uniform set would differ from some of the existing state
laws, thus offending some groups and creating unnecessary opposition to the
Constitution. The problem for the Committee, then, became that of determining
which body would set the qualifications. Having Congress set the qualifications
2
was rejected on the grounds that it would be too easy for Congress to usurp the
electoral process and set up an aristocracy or oligarchy.03 This left only one
choice; the states would set the qualifications. However, there had to be some
protection against the state legislatures appointing themselves, alone, as the
electors of federal representatives (this suggestion having been abandoned early
in the convention).94 The second half of the sentence, "the Electors in each state
shall have the qualifications requisite for Elector of the most numerous Branch
of the State Legislature" was added to insure that state legislatures did not
appropriate the vote solely to themselves. It was felt that the people and the
State Constitutions would protect the already given vote adequately.95
Since the Convention, six amendments9 6 have been passed in order to
further promote and safeguard the integrity of the electoral process. The Con-
stitutional Convention intended that the state legislatures would set the quali-
fications for voting in federal elections. The restrictions of Article I section 2
were intended as restrictions on the power of the state legislatures to limit the
franchise in a less democratic manner than existed in state elections. Thus, to
utilize this section to prevent the extension of the right to vote would not only
build into the Constitution an unnecessary conflict with the Equal Protection
Clause but also thwart the intention of the framers of the Constitution.
THE RIGHT To VoTE
The American Revolution was fought to assure that the inhabitants of
the Thirteen Colonies would direct their own destiny. They were not satisfied
to be controlled by a King or by representatives to the British Parliament
democratically elected by someone else. Neither are the three million Americans
living abroad97 content to let their fate be decided by those citizens living within
89. See notes 7-13 supra and accompanying text.
90. 2 FARRAzD 201.
91. Evidence of this difficulty is clearly demonstrated by the debate which followed
Mr. Wilson's statement; see 2 FARRAND 201-06.
92. This solution was incorporated in tentative drafts by the Committee on Detail;
see, e.g., 2 FARRAwN 153 and Mr. Madison, 2 FARRAD 203-04.
93. See comments of Messrs. Mason and Butler, 2 FARRAND 201-02.
94. See 1 FARRAND 131.
95. See comment of Mr. Elsworth, 2 FARRAND 201.
96. U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XV, XVII, XIX, XXIII, XXIV.
97. Lardner, Reforms in State Laws Pressed to Let U.S. Citizens Abroad Vote, Wash-
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the United States. In the 1964 election a vigorous campaign was waged in
Europe, 98 yet only a disappointingly small number of Americans were able to
voteY9 In response to this situation various groups of Americans living abroad
banded together to form the Bipartisan Committee on Absentee Voting. As yet,
the Committee's efforts have not met with success, beyond the recommendations
included in the Voting Assistance Act of 1955.100
Americans living abroad play a vital role in the development of the United
States. Those in the employ of the federal government aid in the conduct of
this nation's foreign relations and in the defense of the nation. Those pri-
vately employed help expand the economy of the United States as well as
develop the economies of other nations. The right to travel and live where he
wishes is guaranteed to every citizen of the United States. 0 1 The exercise of
this right cannot be used as a basis for punishment, 10 2 and it must not be used
as the basis for the deprivation of a democracy's most precious attribute-the
vote.
While it is true that the founding fathers did not consider the right to vote
to be an incident of citizenship, constitutional amendments and a deeper under-
standing of political equality have developed our constitutional structure. In
1789, it was considered proper to limit suffrage to those who owned land. Today
land qualifications for voting in general elections would be considered arbitrary
discrimination. As mentioned, in 1966 the last vestige of this system was abol-
ished in a Supreme Court decision voiding the poll tax in state elections.' 0 3 In
the same manner Americans living abroad are presently subjected to the will
of their fellow citizens when they are denied their right to vote. The basis of
the vote is citizenship. Under our federal form of government it is state citizen-
ship. Unless the state can show some disability that is relevant to voting it may
not deny the vote. Residency is not a relevant consideration to voting in federal
elections. The test is whether the citizen remains under the jurisdiction of the
elected authorities. If he is, then, unless he is given the right to vote, he is sub-
jected to the tyranny of the rest.
Although the courts have not faced the problems raised in this article, there
is ample precedent in the reapportionment cases' 0 4 to indicate their power to
force state legislatures to restructure voting systems in order to comply with
ington Post, January 3, 1967. Of these, at least a minimum of 750,000 are civilians who are
registered at U.S. Embassies and Consulates--although a more reasonable estimate is 1.5
million. See testimony of Fred M. Vinson, Jr. Assistant Attorney General in Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections of the Senate Committee on Rules and Ad-
ministration, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., June 28, 1967, at 22.
98. Tx MAGAzllE, October 9, 1964, at 30.
99. See article in Washington Post, supra note 97.
100. See notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text.
101. See note 64 supra.
102. See notes 64 and 65 supra, and accompanying text.
103. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
104. Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). For a discussion of some of the cases
applying Reynolds, see Note, 79 MHaIv. L. REv. 1228, 1252 et seq. (1966).
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the Equal Protection Clause. However, it should not be necessary for the courts
to intervene. The Constitution gives primary responsibility for the establish-
ment of voting laws to the state legislatures and Congress. 10 5 The states should
redraft their laws to make explicit the right of all their citizens to vote.10 Con-
gress should exercise its powers under Article I section 4107 to insure that persons
qualified to vote may vote in those states where the legislatures have not acted
to prevent disenfranchisement due to the technical difficulties of absentee regis-
tration and voting. Finally, Congress should use its powers under section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment, as it did in the Voting Rights Act of 1965,108 to
eliminate the arbitrary discrimination against Americans living abroad.
105. "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second
Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each state shall have the
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature,"
U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cI. 1. "The Times, Places and Manner of Holding Elections for Sen-
ators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulation. . . ." U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 4, cl. 1.
106. See the discussion in Part I of the problems of qualifying under existing state law
where it is noted that under many state laws the American living abroad may have a theo-
retical right which is difficult or impossible to exercise in practice. For text of art. I, § 4,
cL 1, see note 105 supra.
107. See note 88, supra. At the time of this writing, the Senate Subcommittee on Priv-
ileges and Elections has been considering S. 1881, which would insure the right of Americans
abroad to vote in Presidential elections.
108. See note 6 supra.
